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DEVELOPING EXPOSURE-BASED PRECONCEPTION
TORT LIABILITY: A SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGE TO
TRADITIONAL TORT CONCEPTS
Nicholas P. Putz+
As society progresses, human interaction with the environment becomes
increasingly precarious. According to many scholars, “[t]here is increasing
acceptance of the assertion . . . that most human disease, if not all, is the result
of the interaction between underlying genetic susceptibility and exposures to
various components of the environment, including chemical, dietary, infectious,
physical, and behavioral.”1 Unfortunately, the U.S. legal system has continually
struggled to reconcile scientific advances with legal precedent and doctrinal tort
concepts.2 Commonly referred to as a “preconception” tort, U.S. courts are
+
J.D. Candidate, May 2017, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A.,
2014, Xavier University. The author extends his most sincere gratitude to Mr. Adam Dinnell for
his expertise and guidance in drafting this Comment. The author is also grateful to his family and
friends who have supported throughout his time in law school. Finally, the author would like to
extend his thanks to the Catholic University Law Review for its assistance in publishing this
Comment.
1. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 418 (Sarah Boslaugh ed., 2008); see also Jamie A.
Grodsky, Genetics and Environmental Law: Redefining Public Health, 93 CAL. L. REV. 171, 267–
68 (2005). Grodsky asserts that:
[t]he additional data yielded by new scientific capabilities might bolster the claims of
populations affected by such risk. Information concerning environmental susceptibilities,
exposure, and subclinical biological effects may serve as the ingredients for a new
generation of tort claims based on injuries from chemical exposure, as well as increased
risk in the absence of manifest injury.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
2. See, e.g., Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Technological
Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 515–16 (2005)
(positing that, when dealing with scientific or technological advances, such as in vitro fertilization,
“[t]he law is frequently accused of containing gaps, of being slow or outpaced and thus lagging
behind technology, and of needing to respond to new technologies and address new issues”);
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Science-Dependent Prosecution and the Problem of Epistemic
Contingency: A Study of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 62 ALA. L. REV. 513, 526 (2011) (providing an
analysis of how criminal proceedings relating to shaken baby syndrome, a concept that relies
heavily on scientific evidence, had severely lagged behind scientific advances for a significant
period of time); see generally Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and Toxic Torts: Dismantling the RiskInjury Divide, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1671, 1733–34 (2007). Grodsky provides a vivid description of
how medical advances challenge classic legal thinking:
As the medical world leaps forward to prevent and treat disease at the subcellular level,
the law’s traditional focus on overt, symptomatic disease is increasingly out of step with
science. New constellations of biological markers may indicate that bodily integrity has
been compromised well before the appearance of classic symptoms. By forcing plaintiffs
to attain late-stage injury before seeking remedies, current toxic tort law may actually
discourage medical interventions that could benefit both defendants and plaintiffs. If the
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extremely hesitant to extend recovery to plaintiffs who allegedly suffered an
injury caused prior to conception from exposure to a hazardous substance.3
However, what may be even more telling of this hesitancy is the reluctance of
courts to extend recovery to injuries that resulted from hazardous exposure in
utero.4 One of the most difficult challenges facing plaintiffs is the ability to
establish a duty that often spans two to three generations, which often depends
on whether the injury suffered was foreseeable at the time the parent or
grandparent was affected.5 Additionally, as many causes of action are rooted in
exposure to toxic or hazardous materials, plaintiffs also struggle to establish a
clear and definite theory of causation.6 In general, courts have refused to uphold
preconception tort actions for three main reasons: (1) there is no duty to
subsequently conceived offspring;7 (2) it is difficult to establish causation by
pinpointing genetic damage and tracing it back to a single incident;8 and (3)
public policy does not favor recognizing preconception tort actions.9
law remains wedded to conventional notions of injury, it will ignore the fruits of a
scientific revolution and thus may forego preventive opportunities as yet unimagined.
Id. See also Monroe E. Price, The Newness of New Technology, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1885, 1913
(2001). Price discusses the notion of a lagging judiciary within the context of technological
advances, contending that:
[l]aw moves more slowly than its external impacts and not always or immediately in
parallel with them. The development of law is imprisoned in the rhetoric of its prior
existence. That is the weakness, certainly of courts, but of legislatures as well. Altered
flows of information, resulting from new technologies, change the balances that
previously existed in a legal framework. But it is hard to know when those changes undo
the preexisting formulaic approaches to a task.
Id.
3. Julie A. Greenberg, Reconceptualizing Preconception Torts, 64 TENN. L. REV. 315, 342
(1997).
4. Kardas v. Union Carbide Corp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 509, 510 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (holding
that plaintiff who allegedly suffered profound brain damage due to repeated exposure of her father’s
semen to contaminants did not have a preconception cause of action).
5. See Lough v. Rolla Women’s Clinic, Inc. 866 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo. 1993) (asserting that
foreseeability is the paramount factor in determining existence of a duty).
6. See, e.g., Whitlock v. Pepsi Americas, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(opining that future advances in science and medicine could make the attribution of injuries to
chemical exposure clearer).
7. Hegyes v. Unjian Enters., Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 101–02 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
8. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A ‘Public Law’
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 857 (1984) (“Epidemiologists can estimate the
proportion of disease incidence attributable to the ‘excess risk’ created by the toxic agent and the
proportion attributable to the ‘background risk’ – the cumulative risk attributable to all other
factors. But given current limits on our knowledge of the etiology of insidious diseases, and given
the generality of statistical data, it is impossible to pinpoint the actual source of the disease afflicting
any specific member of the exposed population.”).
9. Elsheref v. Applied Materials, Inc., 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 257, 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)
(quoting Oddone v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867, 874 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)) (“One of the
consequences to the community of such an extension [of liability] is the cost of insuring against
liability of unknown but potentially massive dimension.”).
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There is minimal recognition of preconception tort actions throughout the
U.S., often because of a strict adherence to the common tort concepts of duty
and foreseeability by many courts.10 Thus, even with a clear line of causation,
under certain circumstances, some courts continue to refuse to impose
preconception tort liability.11 Perhaps most telling of the general refusal to
recognize preconception torts, outside of a narrow line of cases, is the reliance
on the misleading policy implications of imposing a duty in such scenarios.12
In an effort to prevent overextending traditional tort concepts of duty and
causation, many courts have strongly rejected preconception liability.13 A
special relationship between the alleged tortfeasor and plaintiff provides one
possible way by which to circumvent the foreseeability aspect of causation.14
However, not only have some courts refused to recognize preconception tort
liability absent a special relationship, but they have also consciously construed
such relationships extremely narrowly.15 Because most of the hazardous
exposure cases fall outside the scope of any special relationship, a lack of
foreseeability and inability to pinpoint causation continues to be the demise of
such actions.16
This Comment begins with an analysis of potential recovery for genetic
damage to one’s progeny resulting from hazardous exposure by examining the

10. See, e.g., Hegyes, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 104 (“We refuse to be persuaded by [the] notion that
causation and injury are the sole determinants of liability. The fundamental expression of the need
in the law of negligence for a concept of duty and foreseeability was provided over 60 years ago in
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., and has withstood the test of time.”) (citation omitted).
11. See, e.g., id. at 89 (noting that a duty to the unconceived in California exists only when a
defendant’s conduct involves providing medical services or products relating to the reproductive
process).
12. See, e.g., Elsheref, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 265; see also Daniel S. Goldberg, Against Genetic
Exceptionalism: An Argument in Favor of the Viability of Preconception Genetic Torts, 10 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 259, 271 (2007) (“The major reason courts deny recovery for
preconception genetic torts is fear of multiple-generation liability. Courts are afraid that no
practical limit on liability may exist.”).
13. Elsheref, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 265 (holding the employer of the plaintiff’s father owed no
duty to the plaintiff to protect or warn of possible exposure to hazardous chemicals); Hegyes, 286
Cal. Rptr. at 104 (holding that preconception duty only exists when a defendant’s conduct involves
providing medical services or products directly related to the reproductive process); Albala v. City
of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786, 787 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that recognizing a preconception cause
of action stemming from medical negligence would extend traditional tort concepts too far).
14. Hegyes, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 104 (using special relationships to limit preconception liability
by holding that a duty only exists when the defendant’s conduct involves providing medical
services or products directly related to the reproductive process).
15. Compare Whitlock v. Pepsi Americas, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(holding that no special relationship exists between a polluting landowner and neighbor which
would impose a duty to an unconceived child), with Hegyes, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
16. In re Asbestos Litig., No. 04C-07-099-ASB, 2007 WL 4571196, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct.
Dec. 21, 2007) (refusing to acknowledge a relationship which would give way to a legal duty of
care between husband’s employer and the plaintiff wife, who was exposed to asbestos when
washing her husband’s work clothes).
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treatment of preconception torts in American Jurisprudence. Next, this
Comment focus on the two applicable legal principles of duty and causation,
drawing on comparable tort duties and technological advances in genetic
identification that could strengthen causation. Finally, this Comment argues that
causation and duty exist on a sliding scale. Therefore, with advances in genetic
identification strengthening causation, the duty component of the tort should
become less stringent. In response to policy implications that would arise from
recognizing such a tort, this Comment proposes that the tort inherently limits
itself, but if necessary, statutory regulation may be the best mechanism in
preventing the tort from becoming uncontrollable.
I. PRECONCEPTION TORT LIABILITY—A COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT OF
LIABILITY AND CHALLENGES FACING INJURED PLAINTIFF
A. The Origin of the Preconception Tort
Like any other tort, a preconception tort requires the plaintiff to establish duty,
breach of duty, causation, and injury.17 However, because of the unique nature
of preconception torts, especially those involving exposure, the elements
necessary to establish a cause of action are malleable and much more complex
than usual.18 Elements of causation and duty are particularly problematic, as
evidenced by the difficulties plaintiffs face in establishing preconception
liability.19
1946 marked the first time a U.S. court recognized a cause of action for an
injury to a child prior to birth, when the court in Bonbrest v. Kotz20 reasoned that
the child was viable or “one capable of living outside the womb.”21 Since then,
courts have wrestled with how best to approach these controversial causes of
action.22 In 1963, Jorgenson v. Meade Johnson Labs.23 undercut the viability
test articulated in Bonbrest by recognizing a right of recovery for a wrongful

17. See, e.g., Christopher M. Ernst, 3 Baldwin’s Oh. Prac. Tort L. § 17:2 (2015) (“A
preconception negligence claim must satisfy all the elements of a traditional negligence cause of
action.”).
18. Christopher J. Wiener, Transgenerational Tort Liability for Epigenetic Disease, 13
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 319, 328–30 (2011) (“Three elements [duty of care to the unborn and
their progeny, generational causation, legally cognizable injuries] of a negligence claim are
particularly problematic when confronting a claim for transgenerational epigenetic harm . . .”).
19. Id.
20. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C 1946).
21. Id. at 140.
22. The predicament facing the courts today revolves around reconciling century-old
doctrinal tort concepts with modern scientific and medical advances. Courts view challenges to
these doctrinal concepts, such as duty and foreseeability, as the first in what would be a wave of
limitless litigation. In confronting these challenges, the courts have mostly defended such concepts,
relying on an array of rationale—policy, tortfeasor relationship and legislative specialization. See
infra Section I.B.
23. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
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action that occurred prior to conception.24 Subsequently, courts have applied
the rationale of Jorgenson and recognized preconception tort liability because
the child’s existence triggers the ability to recover.25 Preconception tort actions
of this type have been successful, in part, because of the definite causation link
traceable from the injury to the defendant.26 However, the recognition of
preconception tort liability in Jorgenson and Renslow did not lead to widespread
acceptance of preconception tort liability throughout the United States, as courts
have limited the applicability of these holdings to a subset of factually identical
cases.27
B. The Pot Calling the Kettle Black: The Arbitrary Refusal of Courts not to
Impose a Preconception Duty
Much less scientific than the causation aspect of preconception torts, the
question of duty turns almost solely on policy. Embedded in these policy
considerations is the hardened concept of foreseeability, established by Judge
Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.28 According to Cardozo,
negligence is “a term of relation.”29 Thus, one does not owe a duty to
unforeseeable plaintiffs.30 Some courts have been weary of imposing a duty to
the unconceived solely on the basis of an inability to reconcile foreseeable
liability and endless liability.31 Because courts must consider the repercussions

24. Id. at 240 (noting one would not deny recovery to an infant suffering injury as a result of
a defective food product manufactured prior to conception).
25. See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 1977) (holding that
“there is a right to be born free from prenatal injuries foreseeably caused by a breach of duty to the
child’s mother” but injury can only occur after existence, not prior); see also David S. Steefel,
Preconception Torts: Foreseeing the Unconceived Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 48 U. COLO.
L. REV. 621, 624 (1977) (noting that this constitutes “a biological approach to justify recovery for
preconception torts”).
26. In Renslow, causation was premised on the well-established medical fact that Rh-positive
blood is never transfused with Rh-negative blood, thus effectively eliminating the need for the court
to grapple with complex causation issues. Renslow, 367 N.E.2d at 1253.
27. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 335–41. Greenberg notes that courts have limited the
recognition of preconception liability with most states willing only to recognize preconception
liability in medical malpractice actions and products liability action. Id. In 1997, only three states
had considered whether to impose preconception liability outside of medical malpractice and
preconception liability, with Indiana being the only state to allow the cause of action to proceed to
trial. Id. at 340–41.
28. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
29. Id. at 101.
30. Id. (“If the harm was not willful, he must show that the act as to him had possibilities of
danger so many and apparent as to entitle him to be protected against the doing of it though the
harm was unintended.”).
31. See, e.g., Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786, 787 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that
recognizing a preconception cause of action stemming from medical negligence would extend
traditional tort concepts too far).
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of their holdings, the concern of overextending liability by recognizing a duty to
the unconceived is quite common.32
1. Adherence to Foreseeability in Preventing Limitless Liability
Albala v. City of New York33 was a case in which the argument in favor of
finding preconception tort liability appeared to be strong. However, the Court
of Appeals of New York refused to recognize any such action.34 In Albala, the
plaintiff’s mother suffered a damaged uterus when she underwent an abortion.35
Four years after the negligently administered abortion, the plaintiff was born
with severe brain damage, allegedly caused by the mother’s damaged uterus.36
In holding that the plaintiff did not have a cognizable cause of action, the court
noted the “staggering implications of any proposition which would honor claims
assuming the breach of an identifiable duty for less than a perfect birth and by
what standard and the difficulty in establishing a standard or definition of
perfection.”37
Echoing Albala, Catherwood v. American Sterilizer Co.38 refused to consider
the possibility of recovery for a plaintiff alleging that her mother’s exposure to
a hazardous substance caused chromosomal damage.39 The court acknowledged
that New York had “carefully avoided opening the doors to litigation by
plaintiffs claiming injury due to acts of defendants before their birth[,]” and thus,
reiterated that it would abide by precedent in refusing to recognize a duty to the
unconceived.40
In Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc.,41 a California court discussed the
importance of foreseeability in preconception cases, noting:
[w]e refuse to be persuaded by [the] notion that causation and injury
are the sole determinants of liability. The fundamental expression of
the need in the law of negligence for a concept of duty and
foreseeability was provided over 60 years ago in Palsgraf v. Long
Island R. Co., and has withstood the test of time.”42

32. See, e.g., id. (“We are of the opinion that the recognition of a cause of action under these
circumstances would require the extension of traditional tort concepts beyond manageable
bounds”).
33. 428 N.E.2d 786 (N.Y. 1981).
34. Id. at 788.
35. Id. at 787.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 273 (citing Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411 (N.Y. 1978)) (citation omitted).
38. 498 N.Y.S.2d 703 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
39. Id. at 705.
40. Id. at 706.
41. 286 Cal. Rptr. 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
42. Id. at 104 (citation omitted).
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In Hegyes, the plaintiff’s mother was injured in a car accident two years prior
to conception.43 Directly following the accident, the mother was fitted with a
lumbo-peritoneal shunt,44 which eventually caused the plaintiff’s premature
birth and resulted in various personal injuries.45 The court held that the
defendant owed no legal duty to the subsequently conceived child, as the
defendant’s conduct of driving negligently “was not ‘likely to result’ in
plaintiff’s conception or birth, let alone her alleged injuries nearly three years
after the car accident.”46 Although unrelated to any type of exposure or genetic
damage, Hegyes remains a seminal preconception tort case, as it underlines the
reluctance of courts to impose an unforeseeable duty or limitless liability on a
preconception tortfeasor.47
Policy rationale, although much different in nature, was yet again the demise
of a preconception tort in Peters v. Texas Instruments Inc.,48 where the plaintiff
alleged that his father’s exposure to toxic substances at work caused him to be
born with several birth defects, including partial blindness.49 Distinct from the
policy rationale of Albala, the court acknowledged that Texas precedent
established that it was the role of the legislature, rather than the judiciary, to
recognize such complex actions.50 In support of this, the court cited a prior
Texas case which pointed to the necessity of research and analysis of scientific
and medical data, and the development of specific laws to address the findings—
a procedure unique to the legislature.51

43. Id. at 86.
44. Id. A lumbar-peritoneal shunt is a tube inserted between two vertebrae in the lumbar
portion of the spine to redirect excess fluid. Spinal Shunt, BEAUMONT, www.beaumont.edu/
neuroscience/neurological-treatments-services/spinal-shunt (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
45. Hegyes, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
46. Id. at 101.
47. See, e.g., Whitlock v. Pepsi Americas, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1126–27 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(holding that “to date no California courts have found a duty to a preconception plaintiff for torts
unrelated to the reproduction context. Hegyes has been the law in California for 19 years.”).
48. C.A. No. 10C–06–043 JRJ, 2011 WL 4686518 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011).
49. Id. at *1.
50. Id. at *7.
To the extent a workable standard of care could be developed or the scope of conduct to
which the standard is applied could be limited, it would only be through extensive
research and analysis of scientific and medical data, an evaluation of broad matters of
public policy, and the development of specific laws to address the concerns and needs of
the citizenry. These matters are uniquely within the realm of the legislature, not the
judiciary. It is the legislature’s role to reflect the values of its constituents in its creation
of laws.
Id. (quoting Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex. App. 1999) (emphasis in original).
51. Id. at *6–7 (citing Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 477-78).
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2. Narrowly Construing Special Relationships to Limit Duty to the
Unconceived
When deciding whether to impose a duty, courts have regularly looked to the
relationship between the alleged tortfeasor and the plaintiff.52 Many successful
plaintiffs have relied on special relationships53 to convince courts to recognize a
duty to the unconceived.54 However, courts continue to emphasize the narrow
applicability of such relationships.55 Thus, because most, if not all, hazardous
exposure cases fall outside the scope of any special relationship, the inability to
establish foreseeability continues to be the demise of such actions.56
In Rodriguez v. Intel Corp.,57 a Delaware state court rejected the plaintiff’s
attempt to establish a special relationship and declined to impose a duty on the
defendant.58 In Rodriguez, the plaintiff alleged that her father’s preconception
exposure to reproductively harmful chemicals while working at the defendants’
factories caused severe birth defects.59 Although the relationship between the
father and the defendants may have been sufficient to impose a duty, the court
held that a preconception duty would not be recognized because the plaintiff did
not demonstrate a special relationship between the defendants and the plaintiff
child.60
Similarly, the California Court of Appeals has narrowly construed special
relationships, holding that an employer/employee relationship does not establish
a duty to the employee’s unconceived children.61 In Elsheref, the plaintiff
alleged that his father’s preconception exposure to toxic chemicals, while
working at the defendant’s factory, caused multiple birth defects.62 Concluding
that the workplace relationship was not sufficient to establish a special
relationship, not only did the court hold that the defendant did not have a duty
to protect the plaintiff, but the court also held that the defendant did not have a
duty to warn the plaintiff’s father that certain chemicals may pose a danger to

52. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Intel Corp., C.A. No. N11C–08–029 JRJ, 2014 WL 605472, at *7
(Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2014) (holding that a preconception duty to the plaintiff could not be
imposed absent the existence of a special relationship).
53. For example, a relationship like “physician-patient” constitutes a special relationship.
Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
54. See id. at 90, 93, 94–95 (“[C]ase law imposes liability only when there is a ‘special
relationship’ between the defendant and the mother giving rise to a duty to the minor plaintiff. The
defendant’s conduct in those cases is inextricably related to the inevitable future pregnancy, a key
element missing from the present facts.”) (emphasis in original).
55. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 2014 WL 605472, at *6–8.
57. C.A. No. N11C–08–029 JRJ, 2014 WL 605472 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2014).
58. Id. at *1, *7.
59. Id. at *1.
60. Id. at *7.
61. See Elsheref v. Applied Materials, Inc., 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 257, 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
62. See id. at 260.
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his unborn children.63 By refusing to impose a duty to warn, Elsheref moved a
step further than most courts, thereby exemplifying the reluctance of courts to
impose any sort of preconception duty.64
C. Establishing Causation Without Actually Establishing Causation
One would think that advances in science and technology may afford courts
the ability to more easily recognize preconception torts, but this is often not the
case.65 However, the need to properly compensate victims and deter wrongful
conduct may begin to push courts to think differently.66 Regardless, paintiffs
face an upward battle in convincing a court that a single substance or action is
responsible for an injury, given that humans are exposed to a variety of
chemicals and substances on a daily basis.67 Plaintiffs must not only
demonstrate that a substance or product is able to cause an injury, but also that
the resulting harm is directly attributable to that substance or product—what are
commonly referred to as general and specific causation, respectively.68
1. General Causation
a. Epidemiological Causation
The use of epidemiological evidence is the most common way to prove
general causation.69 Epidemiological evidence establishes cause and effect by
63. See id at 265.
64. Compare id. (refusing to impose a duty to warn), with supra notes 33–51 and
accompanying text (courts refusing to impose a duty of care, but not reaching the question of duty
to warn).
65. See Allison Hite, Who’s to Blame?: How Genetic Information Will Lead to More Accurate
Decisions in Toxic Tort Litigation, 63 S.C. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2012) (“In the absence of the
exacting science that courts crave, decisions in toxic tort cases are often based on mere inferences.”)
(emphasis omitted).
66. See Steefel, supra note 25, at 625 (noting that “[t]he birth of children with debilitating
physical injuries imposes undesirable costs on society” and “to the extent that the tort law is
compensatory, it is irrelevant whether the plaintiff exists when the tortious conduct initially
occurs.”).
67. See Danielle Conway-Jones, Factual Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation: A Philosophical
View of Proof and Certainty in Uncertain Disciplines, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 875, 881–82 (2002)
(“Because a toxic exposure plaintiff may have encountered various background risks, proving that
the specific toxin caused her injury strongly militates against a finding of factual causation in
today’s legal climate.”).
68. Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury, 78 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1447–51 (2005).
69. See Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 882 (10th Cir. 2005) (“We agree
with the district court that epidemiology is the best evidence of general causation in a toxic tort
case.”); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1403 (D. Or. 1996) (“The existence
or nonexistence of relevant epidemiology can be a significant factor in proving general causation
in toxic tort cases.”); Neal C. Stout, Judging the Reliability of Expert Causation Opinions Based
on Epidemiology Data After King v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company: Is the Judge
a Gatekeeper or a Matador?, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1049, 1052 (2010) (“Epidemiology is a
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“comparing the incidence of disease across exposed and unexposed populations,
or comparing the incidence of exposure across sick and healthy populations.”70
Therefore, epidemiological evidence does not establish that an injury directly
resulted from exposure, but merely that it could have resulted from such
exposure.71 Although plaintiffs cannot rely solely upon epidemiological
evidence to establish causation, courts have noted the important role the
evidence plays in demonstrating a plausible link between exposure and injury.72
Absent the ability to show anything more than a mere probability, plaintiffs must
provide scientific evidence that gives courts the opportunity to reach a concrete
conclusion.73
b. Temporal Causation
If unable to rely on a scientific connection, plaintiffs may attempt to prove
general causation by showing a temporal relationship between exposure and
injury.74 Under Daubert, most courts do not consider a temporal connection
alone to be sufficient proof of causation.75 However, “[a] temporal, or
chronological, relationship must exist for causation to exist.”76 For plaintiffs
alleging injury stemming from preconception exposure, temporal evidence has

branch of science focusing on the question of general causation, that is, whether a substance is
capable of causing a particular disease.”).
70. Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and
Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 379–80 (1986).
71. Michael Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 608–09 (3d ed. 2011) (noting that specific causation is beyond epidemiology
and that “epidemiologists investigate whether an agent can cause a disease, not whether an agent
did cause a specific plaintiff’s disease”).
72. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1239–40 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), aff’d sub nom, In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.
1987) (“In a mass tort case such as Agent Orange, epidemiologic studies on causation assume a
role of critical importance . . .[and] [c]ommentators have approved the growing judicial reliance on
such scientific evidence.”).
73. Gold, supra note 70, at 379-80 (“[I]n an individual case, epidemiology cannot
conclusively prove causation; at best, it can establish only a certain probability that a randomly
selected case of disease was one that would not have occurred absent exposure, or the ‘relative risk’
of the exposed population.”).
74. Alani Golanski, General Causation at A Crossroads in Toxic Tort Cases, 108 PENN ST.
L. REV. 479, 508 (2003).
75. See Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 273 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc). In
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., the Supreme Court developed a list of factors for
admissibility of scientific expert testimony under Fed. Rule Evid. 702, articulating that courts are
to consider 1) whether the scientific methodology can be tested; 2) whether the technique has been
subject to peer review or publication; 3) whether there is a known or potential error rate; 4) the
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation and 5) whether the
methodology is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–94 (1993).
76. Green et al., supra note 71, at 601.
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minimal utility, given the lengthy period between exposure and actual injury.77
Still, temporal evidence provides a causal link between the initial exposure and
the corresponding genetic damage regardless of how many years ago the event
may have occurred.78
For example, in Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc.,79 the plaintiff alleged that his
exposure to a toxic chemical caused reactive airways dysfunction syndrome.80
With just a few months separating the exposure and his diagnosis, the plaintiff
attempted to use the temporal relationship as evidence of causation.81 The court
rejected this reasoning, holding that, absent any scientific evidence, and “[i]n the
absence of an established specific connection between exposure and illness . . .
the temporal connection between exposure to chemicals and an onset of
symptoms, standing alone, is entitled to little weight in determining causation.”82
However, some courts have allowed such evidence to be introduced. For
example, in Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB83 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit allowed the plaintiff to introduce expert testimony relating the
temporal proximity of exposure to the onset and worsening of sinus problems as
evidence of causation.84 The court reasoned that “depending on the
circumstances, a temporal relationship between exposure to a substance and the
onset of a disease or a worsening of symptoms can provide compelling evidence
of causation.”85
2. Specific Causation
Needing to show more than the capability of a substance to cause injury,
plaintiffs have struggled to demonstrate a definite connection between exposure
and injury.86 Some courts have required plaintiffs prove that “a defendant’s
conduct more than doubled the plaintiff’s risk of injury” in order to establish

77. Id. at 601–02.
78. Id. at 601.
79. 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998).
80. Id. at 272.
81. Id. at 278 (citing Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 772–73 (E.D. Va. 1995)) (“The
proffered expert relied substantially on the temporal proximity between exposure and symptoms.”).
82. Id.
83. 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999).
84. Id. at 265.
85. Id.
86. Golanski, supra note 74, at 487 (“Establishing specific causation under traditional
standards would be ‘oppressively problematic’ in the toxic tort area because these cases typically
involve long latency periods between exposure and illness, as well as disease types that may be
associated with multiple causal factors. At the same time, the specific causation requirement
usually endures in some form, and plaintiffs who establish a substance’s general harmful propensity
may still fail to demonstrate that it probably caused their injury.”); Lin, supra note 68, at 1449–52;
see also Joseph Sanders, Apportionment and Proof in Toxic Injury Cases, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 200, 202 (2000) (noting that “[s]pecific causation evidence seems to be the holy grail of
toxic torts”).
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causation beyond a preponderance of the evidence.87 Although this requirement
is essentially synonymous to extremely strong epidemiological evidence,
without any mechanisms that provide absolute certainty, courts are forced to
make a judgment call.88
Thus, with respect to specific causation,
epidemiological evidence can only show an extremely high probability that the
relative risk of injury was doubled.89 Without any absolute conclusiveness,
defendants utilize experts to undermine the certainty of causation.90
a. Toxicogenomics
With plaintiffs struggling to establish causation, toxicogenomics might
provide the solution plaintiffs are seeking. An emerging scientific field,
toxicogenomics analyzes the “impact of potentially toxic compounds on gene
expression.”91 Although the admissibility of toxicological evidence is often
more controversial than the admissibility of epidemiological evidence, such
evidence can provide heightened levels of specificity.92 For example,
toxicogenomics “permit[s] researchers to isolate the effects of exposure to a
87. Lin, supra note 68, at 1449–52 (emphasis omitted); Green et al., supra note 71, at 612
(“Courts . . . have permitted expert witnesses to testify to specific causation based on the logic of
the effect of a doubling of the risk.”).
88. See generally Lin, supra note 68, at 1449–52 (discussing the different methods courts use
to determine causation).
89. Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of
Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2126–28 (1997); David E. Bernstein, Getting to
Causation in Toxic Tort Cases, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 51, 54 (2008) (“[T]he plaintiff must show that
the exposure at issue did not simply slightly raise the hypothetical risk of injury, but in fact more
than doubled the risk of the harm. Courts, borrowing scientific terminology, often refer to the
doubling of the risk as a ‘relative risk’ of greater than two. In legal terms, this equates to ensuring
that a preponderance of the evidence shows that the relevant exposure was the cause of his injury.”).
90. Berger, supra note 89, at 2129–29 (“In summary, the scientific evidence relied on to prove
causation is subject to numerous kinds of uncertainty.”); see also Conway-Jones, supra note 67, at
884–85. A discussion by Conway-Jones about background risks is indicative of another way in
which to inject uncertainty into causation:
One external problem is the existence of background risks that may cause a harm similar
to the type of harm that could also be caused by exposure to a toxic substance. Scientific
proof must isolate, or at the very least, account for background risks before plaintiffs can
affirmatively state, with sufficient mathematical probability, that a toxic exposure is
causally related to or associated with a disease or injury. The persistent reality is that
populations in industrialized communities are exposed to multiple natural, as well as
artificial, byproducts that may affect individuals as readily as any exposure to a toxic
substance.
Id. at 884.
91. John C. Childs, Toxicogenomics: New Chapter in Causation and Exposure in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 441, 441 (2002); see also Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin,
Reference Guide on Toxicology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 401, 403 (2d
ed. 2011) (quoting CASARETT AND DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 13
(Curtis D. Klaassen ed., 5th ed. 1996) (“[Toxicogenomics] is ‘the study of the adverse effects of
chemicals on living organisms.’”).
92. Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 91, at 413–14.
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single chemical or to known mixtures . . . offer[ing] unique information
concerning dose-response relationships, mechanisms of action, specificity of
response, and other information relevant to the assessment of causation.”93 By
analyzing how different environmental interactions impact gene expression,
toxicogenomics can provide highly conclusive evidence of disease causation.94
The most popular monitoring method is a DNA microarray, which provides
“simultaneous monitoring of gene expression levels . . . .”95 Scientists are able
to identify sources of acquired disease, genetic mutations caused by exposure,
and the degree to which certain toxins are responsible for the onset of disease.96
The strength of this evidence faces the same challenges as epidemiological
evidence because scientists have been unable to isolate other variables or
discount individual susceptibility to disease.97 However, it is certainly a stronger
indicator of causation than the probabilistic epidemiological evidence and may
provide the strongest path to relief for plaintiffs.98
II. CIRCUMVENTING STRICT NOTIONS OF PRECONCEPTION TORT LIABILITY
While the decision of whether to recognize preconception tort liability appears
clear cut on the surface, it is actually anything but clear.99 A crucial factor to
consider is the degree to which this type of liability is linked to century old,
doctrinal tort concepts. The fear of disturbing the interpretation of such concepts
weighs heavily on courts examining preconception tort actions.100 However, the
93. Id. at 414.
94. Childs, supra note 91, at 441–42. Childs provides a concise overview of toxicogenomics,
stating:
It is the study of the impact of potentially toxic compounds on gene expression. A gene
“expresses itself” by acting on proteins and other body processes in very complex ways
to affect how the body grows and develops. Toxicogenomics is the study of the alteration
of those mechanisms that leads to conclusions about disease and disease processes.
Id.
95. Id. at 442.
96. Id. at 443.
97. Id. at 444 (“The task of clearly separately out and assigning causation to a discrete
exposure is complicated by genetic variables affecting individual susceptibility. Every disease will
have a genetic component to its causation.”).
98. Id.
“The value of toxicogenomics to toxic tort litigators is quite apparent. For plaintiffs who
have insufficient scientific proof that a product was more likely than not to cause cancer,
the ability to show that an exposure to the product resulted in a genetic polymorphism or
gene sequence difference, which increased cancer susceptibility, could be outcome
determinative.”
Id.
99. John G. Taylor, Defendant Liability to Plaintiffs Neither Conceived Nor Born at the Time
of Initial Exposure to A Toxic Substance or Drug, 4 PROD. LIAB. L.J. 224, 232 (1993) (“The few
jurisdictions which have had the opportunity to address the preconception tort issue have split as to
whether a cause of action should be recognized.”).
100. See, e.g., Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786, 787–88 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that
the recognition of a preconception cause of action stemming from medical negligence would extend
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fact that tort concepts are grounded in a mindset that never envisioned
technological advances capable of both causing and identifying injury certainly
perpetuates a rigid interpretation.101 For the most part, courts continue to balk at
the opportunity to reconcile doctrinal tort concepts with modern preconception
torts.102 To date, the courts that recognize preconception liability have done so
with so many caveats that any sort of majority consensus has yet to be reached.103
The threads of reasoning on both sides of the issue are explored below.
A. The Great Flood of Litigation (Or Not)
Courts are extremely reluctant to establish precedent that may allow for
limitless liability.104 These policy considerations are often at the forefront when
preconception liability is limited.105 No court wants to be the first to test the
waters of recognizing a duty to the unconceived because doing so could impose
a duty to an unknown and unpredictable population.106 Implicit in the discussion
traditional tort concepts too far); see also Steve C. Gold, When Certainty Dissolves into Probability:
A Legal Vision of Toxic Causation for the Post-Genomic Era, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237, 239
(2013) (Proof of toxic tort claims conforms poorly to the traditional deterministic legal model of
but-for causation, because toxic injuries almost never involve an observable chain of physical
events allowing easy inference of a causal relation between a particular defendant’s conduct and a
particular plaintiff’s harm. Courts turn to science to replace causal intuition, but a disjunction
remains between the probabilities that science can know and the determined result that the law
wants proven.”).
101. Gold, supra note 100, at 321–22.
102. Id. at 239.
103. See, e.g., Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 90, 94, 101 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (recognizing that “[i]n a nonmedical preconception negligence case where there is no alleged
‘special relationship,’ it becomes more difficult to find a legal duty owed to the minor child and,
hence, liability on the part of defendant”).
104. Albala, 429 N.E.2d at 788 (“Unlimited hypotheses accompanied by staggering
implications are manifest. The perimeters of liability although a proper legislative concern, in cases
such as these, cannot be judicially established in a reasonable and practical manner.”); see also
Taylor, supra note 99, at 232 (contending that premising refusal to recognize preconception liability
on being unable to limit liability “is unsatisfactory both in terms of legal policy and because it is
unfounded”).
105. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 270 (noting that “the divergence between courts in
extending or restraining the boundaries of a particular duty rests on conflicting policy analyses,
rather than any disagreements about whether a legal mandate compels a particular boundary”); see
also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
106. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 341.
“The courts that bar all preconception actions, or severely limit the duty owed in
preconception actions, have articulated the following concerns as justification for their
actions: if courts open the door to recovery in any preconception action, a flood of
litigation will ensue; if courts allow recovery to a child who was not conceived at the
time of the negligent act, claims may be brought by successive future generations; if
liability is imposed too far into the future, problems measuring insurance risks and the
exorbitant costs of insurance may place an excessive burden on the defendant and
society; and if recovery is allowed in medical malpractice actions, physicians may be
faced with a conflict of interest between treating the mother or taking precautionary
measures to protect a plaintiff who has not yet been conceived.”
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of limitless liability stemming from the imposition of a preconception duty is the
concept of multi-generational liability.107 Because courts have been unable to
devise a consistent, rational method by which to limit such liability and do not
favor denying recovery simply because of the plaintiff’s generation, often the
only logical solution is to deny recovery for any preconception tort.108
Professor Daniel Goldberg notes that the ability of courts to arbitrarily favor
different policies when imposing duties heavily contributes to the schism
between those recognizing and not recognizing preconception tort duties.109
Thus, plaintiffs may simply be out of luck if faced with a judiciary that refuses
to recognize a preconception action on the basis of policy considerations
informed by foreseeability and duty.110
However, scholars have articulated strong points showing that such limitless
liability is highly unlikely. First, as previously discussed, plaintiffs already face
an uphill battle in simply establishing a liability because of the potential for
multi-generational liability, which essentially operates a market force in limiting
liability at the outset.111 Second, because of the rare combination of events that
give rise to preconception torts, litigation in this area has been minimal,
indicating that a flood of litigation would not follow an expansion of
preconception liability.112 Although these seemingly inherent limitations to the
preconception cause of action may prove to be viable, it is unlikely that courts
that have repeatedly refused to expand preconception tort liability would be
persuaded by this rationale.113 Therefore, plaintiffs must succinctly prove
preconception actions with a level of specificity that would itself impose a
limitation.

Id.
107. Id. at 345.
108. See Catherwood v. American Sterilizer Co., 498 N.Y.S.2d 703, 705 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986)
(referencing the decision of Albala as being “purely one of policy” with both the majority and
dissent noting that “the alleged injuries to the plaintiff therein were foreseeable, causally related
and resulted in ascertainable damages”); see also Goldberg, supra note 12, at 271–72.
109. Id. at 270–71.
110. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
111. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 273.
112. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 342 (noting that in the twenty-four years prior to when her
paper was written, appellate “courts have reported fewer than fifty preconception injury [tort]
cases”); see also Goldberg, supra note 12, at 280 (“Simply banning preconception genetic torts by
declaring that they are not viable claims is ill-advised. As nearly all courts specifically addressing
the problem have noted explicitly or implicitly, preconception genetic torts pose novel and
challenging issues.”).
113. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 3, at 327–29. One such jurisdiction is New York, where
the courts had the opportunity to impose preconception liability four times, but declined on the
ground of limitless liability fears in three of the four cases. Id.
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B. Evidentiary Standards Preclude the Opportunity to Establish
Preconception Tort Liability
Currently, establishing causation is one of the most significant barriers to a
plaintiff’s attempt to recover for a preconception tort. Courts have explicitly
indicated this when rejecting preconception claims.114 The problem for many
plaintiffs is not the fact that the physical causation is weak, but rather that the
mode by which to present evidence of causation to the court is seemingly
impossible.115 Some scholars have proposed that without changes in evidentiary
standards, it may be impossible for plaintiffs to meet the requisite standard of
causation.116 However, it is highly unlikely that courts will modify evidentiary
standards simply because a small group of plaintiffs is struggling to meet the
current evidentiary standards.
Advancements in genetics could provide plaintiffs with sufficient proof to
establish causation in preconception actions.117 Currently, one of the most
accurate methods is the use of biomarkers, which track toxins and the specific
interactions with the body that lead to the development of a disease.118 Even if
such evidence were permitted to be used in the courtroom, it would likely
accompany scientific expert testimony.119 Due to the complexity of both the
studies and the biomarker evidence, the generally accepted interpretation of
Daubert could exclude the evidence if the court deems any of the methodology
to be flawed.120 Given the emerging nature of genetic evidence, modern
evidentiary standards may again pose significant problems to plaintiffs.
C. Timing is Everything: When the Harm Occurs and its Impact on
Preconception Torts
What may seem to be rather unimportant has actually played a significant role
in the analysis of preconception liability. Courts and scholars use the time at
which an injury from a preconception tort occurs as a reason to advocate for and
114. See Whitlock v. Pepsi Americas, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1125–27 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(holding that absent the ability of DNA to attribute an injury directly to the alleged tortfeasor,
causation is not strong enough make an injury foreseeable).
115. Gold, supra note 70, at 379–80 (“The basic impossibility of proving individual causation
distinguishes toxic tort cases from ordinary personal injury suits. Cancers and mutations provide
no physical evidence of the inducing agent, so direct observation of individual plaintiffs provides
little or no evidence of causation in many instances.”); see also Charles L. Moore, Comment,
Radiation and Preconception Injuries: Some Interesting Problems in Tort Law, 28 SW L.J. 414,
423–24 (1974).
116. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 274–75.
117. See Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 7, 7–8
(2006).
118. Goldberg, supra note 12, at 280–81.
119. Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Susceptibility and Biomarkers in Toxic Injury Litigation, 41
JURIMETRICS 67, 86–87 (2000).
120. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 746 (3d Cir. 1994) (establishing the
high level of accuracy courts demand for expert scientific testimony to be admitted).
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against preconception tort liability.121 Two seminal cases, Jorgenson and
Catherwood, limited liability because the injury occurred after conception.122
Some have suggested that this is merely a pleading problem that can be solved
by pleading with a greater degree of specificity.123 However, as technology
advances and the reliance on genetic evidence increases, more accurate
pleadings may not solve the problem.124 If plaintiffs allege an injury to progeny
from a genetic mutation—the alteration of the chromosome had to have occurred
prior to conception—thus eliminating recovery in courts that do not recognize
preconception injury, but only injury to a viable fetus.125
D. Twenty-First Century Challenges to Traditional Tort Concepts
Free from the restraint of archaic legal concepts, groundbreaking scientific
and medical studies have reached conclusions many courts refuse to consider as
remotely possible.126 More specifically, these studies concerning the interaction
between the environment and human genes have expounded on mutations by
genetic and epigenetic mechanisms.127
For example, environmental toxicants, known as endocrine disruptors, “can
induce transgenerational disease states or abnormalities . . . .”128 One particular
study specifically demonstrated that vinclozolin, a fungicide used in vineyards,
121. Compare Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 1977) (“This court
has long recognized that a duty may exist to one foreseeably harmed though he be unknown and
remote in time and place.”), with Goldberg, supra note 12, at 269–70:
Whether or not chromosomal damage is seen as an actionable injury has many
implications for the viability of claims such as increased risk of cancer. Perhaps much
of this may turn upon the pleadings themselves. If the plaintiff in Catherwood had pled
that the exposure occurred before conception and the injuries occurred subsequent to
conception, as did the plaintiffs in Jorgensen, perhaps the New York court would have
decided differently.
122. See Jorgenson v. Meade Johnson Labs., Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 239–40 (10th Cir. 1973)
(noting that actionable preconception torts are limited only to injuries occurring after conception);
see also Catherwood v. American Sterilizer Co., 498 N.Y.S.2d 703, 706 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986)
(denying a preconception tort action on the basis that the injury occurred prior to conception).
123. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 269.
124. See id. at 269–70 (speculating as to whether more accurate pleadings would have changed
the court’s decision in the Catherwood case).
125. Id. at 269.
126. See e.g., Liborio Stuppia et al., Epigenetics and Male Reproduction: The Consequences
of Paternal Lifestyle on Fertility, Embryo Development, and Children Lifetime Health, 5 CLINICAL
EPIGENETICS 120, 121 (2015).
127. Id. at 121. Genetic mutation refers to a change in the actual DNA sequence, while
epigenetic mutation refers to change in gene activity and expression that occurs absent DNA
alteration. Id.; Epigenetic Modifications Regulate Gene Expression, QIAGEN (2008), http://www.
sabiosciences.com/pathwaymagazine/pathways8/epigenetic-modifications-regulate-geneexpression.php.
128. Matthew D. Anway et al., Endocrine Disrupter Vinclozolin Induced Epigenetic
Transgenerational Adult-Onset Disease, ENDOCRINOLOGY, 5515 (Sept. 14, 2006), http://press.
endocrine.org/doi/pdf/10.1210/en.2006-0640.
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can cause the development of certain cancers and kidney disease in future
offspring via an epigenetic mechanism.129
Conversely, as described in a recent scholarly article on epigenetics and the
male reproductive system, many studies have focused on actual genetic
mutation.130 Although these studies produce results that may not hold up as
evidence in a court of law,131 they are indicative of the direction in which
medical and scientific research is headed.
While the results of these studies merely scrape the tip of the iceberg, it will
only be a matter of time before courts are forced to deal with the implications of
these studies on preconception torts. Thus, how courts in the past have
reconciled scientific advances with legal concepts can provide guidance for
courts faced with the challenge of reconciling tort concepts with the potential
implications of scientific advances.
1. DNA Evidence in Criminal Cases
Although the studies examined above have yet to produce results that would
likely be admissible in court, they are headed in the right direction.132 The
introduction of genetic evidence to preconception tort actions will likely take a
vacillating path to acceptance, similar to what occurred when DNA was first
introduced as evidence in criminal cases.133 After an initial period of firm
acceptance, “details of the laboratory procedures were questioned, and
limitations were identified in the statistical and population-genetics models used
in estimating the frequencies of the DNA types.”134
As a result of these attacks, scientists and laboratories were forced to improve
laboratory standards and perform additional research that would likely not be
required within the scientific field.135 However, as with all advances, at some
point lines must be drawn, which “requires an appreciation and understanding
of the law . . . , the costs and benefits of the techniques, and the political and

129. Id.
130. Stuppia et al., supra note 126, at 128. The authors provide the following overview of
studies identifying genetic mutations as a result of substance exposure:
Several studies [have] previously demonstrated the presence of a strong association
between paternal occupational exposures to chemicals and harmful health outcomes in
the offspring. Feychting at al. demonstrated an increased risk of nervous system tumors
related to paternal occupational exposure to pesticides and of leukemia related to
woodwork by fathers. Reid et al. evidenced the presence of high exposure to exhausts
by paternal grandmothers of children with acute lymphoblastic leukemia.
Id.
131. Goldberg, supra note 12, at 265.
132. Stuppia, et al., supra note 126, at 130–31.
133. See David H. Kaye, The Science of DNA Identification: From the Laboratory to the
Courtroom (and Beyond), 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 409, 410–18 (2007).
134. Id. at 413–14.
135. See id. at 416–17.
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ethical principles that foster a free society of autonomous individuals.”136 With
this in mind, experts and scientists working on studies with potential
applicability in the realm of preconception torts should not be discouraged by
judicial resistance, but should instead be encouraged, as evidenced by the
acceptance of DNA evidence in criminal cases.
III. A SYNTHESIS AND SLIDING-SCALE: THE PRESENTATION OF
PRECONCEPTION TORTS BY PLAINTIFFS WILL FORCE THE COURTS TO
COMMONLY RECOGNIZE PRECONCEPTION LIABILITY
The judiciary is not solely responsible for defining and recognizing
preconception tort liabilities stemming from exposure to harmful substances.
Plaintiffs and outside actors must also be proactive in pushing courts to
recognize such actions.137 This cannot be done by focusing on one aspect of the
law, but rather requires a consideration of a range of issues—common tort
concepts, evidentiary standards, and emerging scientific advances. If courts are
actively confronted with a thorough synthesis of the aforementioned factors that
directly address the misgivings in recognizing preconception liability, courts
will be forced to consider ways in which doctrinal tort concepts can be
reconciled with modern advances in science and medicine.138
A. Causation and Duty Operate on a Sliding Scale
The two most important components of preconception torts, duty and
causation, should not be isolated from each other, but rather should operate on a
sliding scale. The isolation of causation and duty from each other strongly
contributes to the refusal of courts to uphold preconception liability. 139
However, when not viewed in isolation, plaintiffs armed with causation
comparable to what was present in Hegyes would have a viable opportunity to
recover.140 Instead of precluding liability solely because the injury to a laterconceived child is arbitrarily deemed unforeseeable, as it may open the door to
limitless liability, courts need to seriously consider the facts in their entirety,
which alone may limit the holding.141

136. Id. at 427.
137. Marchant, supra note 117, at 9–10, 25–26, 36; Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Data in Toxic
Tort Litigation, 45-WTR BRIEF 22 (2016).
138. Marchant, supra note 117, at 9–10, 23, 25–26, 36.
139. See, e.g., Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 101-02 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (refusing to recognize preconception liability where the defendant’s negligent driving clearly
caused an injury to the reproductive system of the mother because no duty could exist to a child
conceived three years later).
140. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 269–71.
141. See id. at 285 (stating that “[t]here is little reason, neither for ‘pure’ legal considerations,
nor for policy concerns, to prevent any preconception genetic tort claim from being brought before
a trier of fact”).
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1. Using Facts to Limit Liability for the Courts
In order for courts to alter the status quo in situations involving innovative or
groundbreaking concepts that may have serious repercussions throughout the
legal field, plaintiffs must provide them with a valid rationale to do so.142 One
way to do this, particularly when dealing with complex, scientific material, is to
emphasize the uniqueness of a preconception tort claim.143 With fewer than fifty
preconception cases reaching appellate courts in the past twenty-four years, the
tort is already a rarity.144
The obscure facts that accompany many preconception tort actions make it
difficult for plaintiffs to piece together a viable theory of liability at the outset.145
For example, in Hegyes, following a car accident, the mother was fitted with a
shunt that directly harmed her reproductive system and eventually caused an
injury to her child.146 Imposing a duty on the negligent driver in this type of
situation would not impose limitless liability for the preconceived child in all car
accidents.147 If a mother were to injure her arm in a car accident, one would not
assert that the driver is liable for any injuries a later-conceived child suffers.
Therefore, the strength of causation and uniqueness of the incident enables
courts to limit liability in an exacting way, thus reducing the fear of limitless
liability.
2. Modern Scientific Advances Provide the Key to Establishing
Preconception Causation
With groundbreaking advancements in science and technology, plaintiffs can
significantly strengthen causation arguments in preconception tort actions.
Although plaintiffs still must prove general and specific causation, a
combination of different types of evidence can make doing so much easier.148
Courts generally accept epidemiological evidence and find it sufficient to

142. See Steven L. Winter, The Next Century of Legal Thought?, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 747,
749 (2001) (contending that “the challenge of the lawyer’s craft is to devise ex ante (i.e., with
predictability) a position that will prevail ex post. To do this, a lawyer must construct an argument
or draft a document that will convince some subsequent set of legal decision makers to take the
desired action”).
143. Taylor, supra note 99, at 232 (noting that only a “few jurisdictions . . . have had the
opportunity to address the preconception tort issue”).
144. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 342.
145. Taylor, supra note 99, at 232 (“The plaintiff will face a substantial burden of
demonstrating foreseeability, duty and causation, and this burden will grow more onerous the
further removed the plaintiff is in place and time from the tortious act.”).
146. Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 86–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
147. Cf. id. at 116 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[a]ny extra burden placed on drivers
by making them responsible to postconceived children-and it seems unlikely to be a significant
burden-would only serve to increase the degree of care drivers must exercise”).
148. Lin, supra note 68, at 1446–51.
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establish general causation.149 On the contrary, courts generally do not accept
temporal evidence, which uses the timing of exposure and injury to establish
causation.150 However, a combination of epidemiological and temporal
evidence can provide plaintiffs with an evidentiary foundation upon which to
establish causation.151 Essentially, if the epidemiological evidence is strong
enough to indicate that exposure to a substance significantly increases the
likelihood of a certain injury, the temporal evidence can provide a way by which
to discount the possibility that something else contributed to the injury.152
Although this combination of evidence cannot function as a means by which to
show specific causation, it lessens the emphasis placed on specific causation.
In addition to strengthening epidemiological evidence, temporal evidence also
provides the requisite link between general and specific causation. One of the
emerging methods of establishing specific causation, DNA microarrays monitor
genetic expressions when exposed to different environmental stimulants.153
Thus, if used properly, DNA microarrays can establish specific causation.
However, one weakness in this method is its inability to isolate the interaction
to a single stimulant, with one hundred percent certainty.154 Again, this is where
temporal evidence can supplement the plaintiff’s inability to completely isolate
genetic expression. Therefore, if a plaintiff can use a DNA microarray to
establish a genetic alteration and temporal evidence to narrow the causation to a
specific time, then the plaintiff may effectively satisfy the requirements of
general and specific causation.155
3. Establishing Liability Through Narrow Relationships and Foreseeable
Consequences
Alternatively, when causation is not as clear as it was in Hegyes, an imposition
of a stringent duty can aid courts in recognizing preconception tort liability.156
This type of stringent duty is most commonly seen in relation to a woman’s
149. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1239–41 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), aff’d sub nom, In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.
1987) (citing numerous cases in which epidemiological evidence was heavily relied upon); see also
Gold, supra note 70, at 379–80 (noting that parties must rely on the relative risks of exposure to
toxic substances established by epidemiological evidence because of the difficulty of proving
individual causation in toxic tort claims).
150. See, e.g., Young v. Burton, 567 F. Supp. 2d 121, 128 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that temporal
evidence “is generally insufficient to establish causation”).
151. See id. at 128–29.
152. See id.
153. Childs, supra note 91, at 441–42.
154. Id. at 444.
155. See Young, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 127–28; see also Childs, supra note 91, at 442–44.
156. See Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“In a
preconception tort case, as in any negligence case, there is an overwhelming need to keep liability
within reasonable bounds and to limit the areas of actionable causation by applying the concept of
duty.”).

496

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 66:475

reproductive system.157 For example, California recognizes a duty to the
unconceived only when the defendant’s conduct involves services or products
relating to the reproductive system.158 A major factor implicit in this line of
reasoning is foreseeability because “[a]ny action that would foreseeably harm a
woman’s reproductive system and her ability to carry a child to term would
presumably also foreseeably harm a child she conceives in the future.”159
Therefore, advances in technology can establish that an injury resulting in
genetic damage to a parent could foreseeably result in an injury suffered by his
or her progeny.160 This essentially mirrors limiting preconception liability to
circumstances concerning a woman’s reproductive system.161 By emphasizing
the foreseeability of tortious actions prior to conception, causation can be
implicitly established, which will reduce the scrutiny of causation.
B. The Possibility of Legislative Action In Recognizing Preconception Tort
Liability
What may seem like a viable option, very few courts have considered the role
of the legislature in adjudicating preconception tort actions. Within the sparse
judicial and academic commentary on this issue, a few common threads of
reasoning are persistent. First, if courts are worried about unlimited liability, it
is the job of the legislature to draw proper lines.162 While this may be true, there
is a strong argument that common tort concepts may actually draw that line
themselves: “[w]ith each successive generation, the burden on the plaintiff of
proving causation and foreseeability grows more and more difficult.”163
However, if courts remain wary of opening the floodgates of litigation even in
the face of this logic, the legislature’s ability to limit liability affords the courts
no excuse to refrain from imposing a duty to the unconceived child.164
Moving a step further, Peters v. Texas Instruments Inc.165 examined the role
of the legislature in imposing a preconception tort duty.166 Highlighting the
inherent complexities of preconception tort actions, the court held that the

157. See id. at 86–97, 89–90.
158. See, e.g., id. at 89–90 (noting that a duty to the unconceived in California exists only when
a defendant’s conduct involves providing medical services or products relating to the reproductive
process).
159. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 355.
160. See Young, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 127–28; Childs, supra note 91, at 442–44; Greenberg, supra
note 3, at 354–56.
161. See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 354–56.
162. See Taylor, supra note 99, at 231–32 (“If, for public policy reasons, the state legislatures
decide that a line must be drawn, then it is the duty of the legislatures, not the courts, to draw the
line.”).
163. Id. at 232.
164. Id. at 229–30, 232.
165. C.A. No. 10C–06–043 JRJ, 2011 WL 4686518, at *6–7 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011).
166. Id.
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legislature is better suited to define preconception liability.167 Although this
assertion may be true, it seems that the legislature’s role in formulating a duty
may be misplaced, as courts are regularly relied upon to interpret and analyze
scientific information post-Daubert.
IV. CONCLUSION
Currently, courts are being forced to weigh a multitude of factors in evaluating
whether to impose preconception liability, such as foreseeability, special
relationships, causation, and policy implications.168 While courts commonly
balance these factors when deciding whether to impose general tort liability, the
complexity and scope of preconception liability poses a substantial challenge. It
follows, that with advances in medicine, science and technology, the causal
effects of certain actions or substances will become more definite, which will
allow courts to impose liability without overextending duty to a limitless
population.169
In order to normalize the recognition of preconception tort liability, plaintiffs
and outside actors must identify weaknesses in the judicial rationale that has
denied recovery. Thus, a complete synthesis of scientifically-advanced
evidence, causation, and duty can establish preconception tort liability. Implicit
in this synthesis is the notion that causation and duty operate on a sliding scale,
where a higher percentage of one requires less of the other. Ultimately, using
the facts of a given situation, plaintiffs must identify the strength of their action,
whether foreseeability or causation, and use that strength to give the judiciary
no choice but to recognize preconception tort liability and begin to reconcile
doctrinal tort concepts with scientific advances.

167. Id.
168. See e.g., Lough v. Rolla Women’s Clinic, Inc. 866 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo. 1993)
(“Foreseeability is the paramount factor in determining existence of a duty . . . .”); Hegyes v. Unjian
Enterprises, Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 90–91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing the role of special
relationships and causation as underlying factors within preconception tort duty); Goldberg, supra
note 12, at 270–71 (“If issues of proximate cause and duty turn on policy considerations, the logical
question becomes what policy considerations have prompted the majority of courts to deny
proximate cause and duty to plaintiffs in preconception genetic torts?”).
169. Marchant, supra note 137, at 23 (“New genetic methods and data have the potential to fill
these scientific uncertainties and data gaps in toxic tort litigation, thus making toxic tort litigation
both more accurate and fair. At the same time, these same genetic data have the potential to make
toxic tort litigation even more complex, contentious, and ethically problematic.”).
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